Overview
GNU Wget, versions 1.25.0 and earlier, contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its implementation of FTP passive mode. Because Wget does not properly validate IP addresses obtained from PASV responses, an attacker-controlled FTP endpoint can redirect the client’s connection to arbitrary IPs, potentially exposing internal network host and service responses. This vulnerability has been remediated in a recent update by GNU; see the Solutions section below for resolution guidance.
Description
GNU Wget is a widely used command-line utility for retrieving content over HTTP, HTTPS, and FTP. When operating over FTP in passive mode, Wget relies on the server’s PASV response to determine which IP address and port to use for the data connection.
CVE-2026-15146 GNU Wget does not validate the IP address provided by an FTP PASV response while operating in FTP passive mode. A malicious FTP server, or an HTTP server that redirects to an FTP URL, can exploit this behavior to redirect Wget’s data connection to an arbitrary IP address and port. This allows an attacker to forge server-side requests (SSRF) from the machine running Wget, potentially accessing localhost services or internal network resources.
This issue belongs to a known class of FTP PASV vulnerabilities such as CVE-2021-40491, which was previously remediated in GNU Inetutils.
Impact
A remote attacker controlling or influencing an FTP endpoint can induce Wget to establish connections to otherwise inaccessible internal network addresses. This may allow the attacker to retrieve service banners, access internal HTTP endpoints, or exfiltrate data from internal systems reachable by the victim host. Applications that embed Wget for automated retrieval are particularly susceptible, because the vulnerability may be triggered automatically through redirected requests and untrusted user-supplied URLs.
Solution
GNU Wget has remediated this issue in the 07/05/2026 commit 4f85853f641863d5915786a8413e1a213726a62b. Users are advised to update their version according to vendor guidance.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Jeremy Brown for researching and reporting this vulnerability. This document was written by Molly Jaconski.