News, updates, trends and the latest
info you need to know about IT

Overview
An authentication bypass vulnerability in the Xerj Console API allows sessions to bypass passkey-backed requirements during token issuance. By exploiting this flaw, an attacker with an existing valid token can create independent, persistent successor credentials directly through the console API. This allows the attacker to maintain access and potentially escalate privileges within the Xerj ecosystem, even if the initial token is revoked.
Description
Xerj is an open-source search and indexing engine tailored specifically for AI agents utilizing the Elasticsearch API, allowing AI models to query a structured index.
The vulnerability, CVE-2026-97406, stems from a flaw in how session states are authenticated and handled within the Xerj system architecture. According to the documented security contract, the issuance of new API tokens must be strictly authorized by a passkey-backed session. However, the Xerj implementation converts both standard browser sessions and API bearer tokens into the same generic AuthSession object. The token creation handler then accepts this generalized principal without verifying whether the session was authenticated via a passkey.
Because of this architectural oversight, an attacker who obtains or intercepts a valid Xerj API token can directly invoke the token creation endpoint, allowing them to create independent successor credentials with the same access levels of the original token. Furthermore, the Xerj platform lacks hierarchical revocation logic; consequently, revoking a compromised parent token has no effect on any descendant tokens spawned from it.
Impact
Exploiting this vulnerability allows an attacker to gain persistent, unauthorized access that completely bypasses multi-factor controls. The security risk escalates significantly if the compromised token belongs to a Xerj account owner. In this scenario, the newly created successor token retains full administrative authority. An attacker can use this persistent access to issue a new account invitation, redeem it in their own browser, and successfully enroll an entirely independent, attacker-controlled passkey. This grants the attacker permanent control over the Xerj instance and its sensitive data indices, rendering the revocation of the initial token completely ineffective.
Solution
The vendor could not be reached to coordinate this vulnerability and an official patch has not been made available at the time of this writing. Users are advised to monitor the project’s GitHub repository for updates and install the latest version of this library once a fix has been released.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the reporter, Shiran Guez, a Principal Application Security Architect.
This document was written by Laurie Tyzenhaus.

Overview
Five Name Constraints findings in BoringSSL (VU#410595.8–.12) describe cases where certificate names may not be constrained as intended. Records .8, .9, .10 and .12 concern the legacy crypto/x509 path; .11 concerns the newer pki path. Two have been fixed, one is accepted, one is disputed, and one was declined.
Description
Name Constraints limit the names a subordinate certificate authority may issue. The reports concern how BoringSSL applies those limits to certain SAN (Subject Alternative Name) forms. The records do not share one status, and they do not all affect the same validation path.
VU#410595.8 (Fixed 2026-03-04): A wildcard DNS name may not be treated as covering a specifically excluded host.
VU#410595.9 (Accepted): A URI with a colon before @ may cause the wrong host to be used when matching URI constraints.
VU#410595.10 (Disputed): The finding concerns first-@ domain extraction in rfc822Name constraint matching. How consuming mail applications interpret the submitted multi-@ input, and whether that creates deployment exploitation, was not established.
VU#410595.11 (Rejected): Trailing-dot handling in rfc822Name domains. The BoringSSL team declined this on 2026-02-28 as below its security threshold.
VU#410595.12 (Fixed 2026-03-04): Trailing-dot DNS names were not always normalized on the legacy validation path.
Using BoringSSL in a product does not mean that product invokes an affected path or name form.
Impact
These findings matter only where Name Constraints are enforced on an affected path, a trusted signature can be obtained over attacker-chosen SAN fields, and the accepted name is used for authorization. Mixed-library environments may accept or reject the same certificate differently. Presence of BoringSSL does not, by itself, mean that Chrome, Android, or other products are affected.
Solution
BoringSSL fixes land in the upstream repository and reach products through each product’s own update process.

VU#410595.8 and .12 were fixed in commit 5774eca on 2026-03-04.
VU#410595.9 is accepted and under coordination.
VU#410595.10 is disputed.
VU#410595.11 was declined.

CERT/CC is not coordinating BoringSSL fixes. For vendor status, contact the BoringSSL team through the Google Issue Tracker. Operators should confirm whether their deployment uses an affected path, apply available updates, and keep issued SANs well formed. A second validator helps only when it uses the same inputs and fails closed.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Oleh Konko for discovering and reporting these issues. This document was prepared with AI assistance by Timur Snoke.

Overview
This note covers thirteen library-specific records (VU#948176.6, .8–.19) of how widely used TLS libraries apply X.509 Name Constraints. The records describe cases where a constrained name may be accepted by one library and rejected by another. Some are fixed, some remain under review, and some were not accepted as security issues.
Description
Name Constraints are meant to keep a subordinate CA inside an allowed namespace. The records cover several name forms and do not all have the same classification. VU#948176.7 does not exist.
DNS case-sensitivity and wildcards. While RFC 5280 requires case-insensitive DNS matching, it does not explicitly define wildcard Subject Alternative Name (SAN) matching, leading to varied implementation behaviors. For instance, GnuTLS was found to perform case-sensitive comparisons on certain names (CVE-2026-3833, fixed in 3.8.13). Similar discrepancies regarding case handling in wildcard parent-constraint lookups were reported in Go, as well as wildcard inconsistencies in LibreSSL and wolfSSL. Additionally, pyca/cryptography was identified to check DNS Name Constraints against certificate SANs but failed to validate them against the requested peer name (CVE-2026-34073, fixed in 46.0.6).
IP addresses. Some libraries treat IPv4 and IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms as different when matching constraints. The Go security team determined that report did not meet its security bar; similar reports exist for Apple’s Security.framework and Mozilla NSS and are included as comparative evidence.
URIs. Libraries can differ on which host they extract from a URI SAN. OpenSSL merged PR #30319 for an @ in the path, query, or fragment; a separate userinfo-colon report remains in triage. Related URI reports exist for Apple, NSS, and wolfSSL (CVE-2026-3547, fixed in 5.9.0). A well-formed single @ is handled per RFC 3986 by most implementations.
Common Name fallback. AWS-LC and s2n-tls were reported to apply DNS constraints inconsistently when a leaf has no SAN and uses a wildcard Common Name. The AWS-LC wildcard-CN issue has been fixed; a separate Unicode CN question remains under coordination. s2n-tls is in triage.
Non-critical constraints. In the reported Mbed TLS configuration, non-critical Name Constraints are not enforced. RFC 5280 requires conforming CAs to mark the extension critical, and the reviewed Mbed TLS 3.x configuration rejects unsupported critical extensions. The vendor treats adding support as a feature request; the reporter’s concern remains disputed.
Impact
These records matter only when an attacker can obtain a trusted signature over chosen certificate fields, reach an affected validation path, and the application uses the accepted identity for authorization. Validator disagreement alone is not exploitation. Effects, if any, are deployment-specific and may include acceptance of a name outside the intended namespace.
Solution
CERT/CC is coordinating remediation across the affected projects. The following summarizes available status; individual entries reflect different reporting and confirmation dates.
GnuTLS — CVE-2026-3833 fixed in 3.8.13.
pyca/cryptography — CVE-2026-34073 fixed in 46.0.6.
wolfSSL — CVE-2026-3547 fixed in 5.9.0. The wildcard was addressed in PR# 9991.
Go’s crypto/x509 — Two reports are in triage. The IPv4-mapped IPv6 report was not accepted as meeting the project’s security bar.
OpenSSL — PR #30319 was merged and, as confirmed on 10 September 2026, is present in all then-current publicly supported versions. The separate userinfo-colon report remains in triage.
Apple’s Security.framework — Three reports submitted on 2026-03-16 remain in triage.
Mozilla NSS — IP-address report under coordination.
LibreSSL — Wildcard report under coordination.
AWS-LC — Wildcard CN issue fixed; Unicode CN report under coordination. s2n-tls is in triage.
Mbed TLS — Non-critical Name Constraints are not enforced in the reported configuration. Marking the extension critical causes such chains to fail closed rather than adding enforcement.
Until updates are widely deployed, operators who depend on Name Constraints should confirm the behavior of the libraries they actually run, keep leaf certificates to explicit SANs, and treat issuance policy as the first control. A second validator helps only when it uses the same inputs and fails closed.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Oleh Konko for discovering and reporting these issues. This document was prepared with AI assistance by Timur Snoke.